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ABSTRACT
Smart metering is an essential feature of smart grids, al-
lowing residential customers to monitor and reduce elec-
tricity costs. Devices called smart meters allows residential
customers to monitor and reduce electricity costs, promot-
ing energy saving, demand management, and energy effi-
ciency. However, monitoring a households’ energy consump-
tion through smart meters poses serious privacy threats, and
have thus become a major privacy issue. Hence, a significant
amount of research has appeared recently with the purpose
of providing methods and mechanisms to reconcile smart
metering technologies and privacy requirements. However,
most current approaches fall short in meeting one of several
of the requirements for privacy preserving smart metering
systems. In this paper we show how Intel SGX technology
can be used to provide a simple and general solution for
the smart metering privacy problem that meets all these re-
quirements in a satisfactory way. Moreover, we present also
an implementation of the proposed architecture as well as a
series of experiments that have been carried out in order to
assess how the proposed solution performs in comparison to
a second implementation of the architecture that completely
disregards privacy issues.
CCS Concepts
•Security and privacy → Privacy-preserving proto-
cols; Hardware security implementation; Security
protocols; Data anonymization and sanitization; In-
formation accountability and usage control; Privacy
protections;
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Electricity is today the most important single source of car-
bon dioxide emission, and hence it is considered one of the
main contributors to climate change. Growing energy needs
are therefore forcing governments to find more efficient and
economic ways to manage the energy grid and improve load
balancing. To this end, the current electrical power system is
undergoing significant modernization with the introduction
of information technologies, turning into what is commonly
called “smart grid”. Smart grids are basically power net-
works enhanced with information technology and an intelli-
gent metering infrastructure. The purpose is to integrate the
behavior and actions of all involved actors and components
in order to ensure an economically efficient, robust, secure
and reliable power system with minimal power loss. Among
its benefits is a quicker response for changes in electricity
demand, made possible by the use of intelligent electronic
devices such as load controllers, sensors, and smart meters.
Smart metering is an essential feature of smart grids, allow-
ing residential customers to monitor and thereby reduce elec-
tricity costs. The key component of a smart metering system
is an electronic device called smart meter (SM), which is in-
tended to substitute ordinary electromechanical meters that
provide only energy measurement data. Unlike the latter, a
smart meter can record energy consumption at determined
time intervals and report it to the utility supplier for pur-
poses of monitoring and billing. This is done by means of
a two-way communication link between the SM and other
components of the metering system. In theory, SMs could
be capable of communicating with any other devices, in-
cluding other SMs, and of executing both local and remote
command signals.
The ability to remotely read fine-grained measurements or
energy consumption is the most important feature of smart
metering. This feature would enable grid operators to per-
form efficient load balancing and to offer customers time-
dependent tariffs. In this way, SMs may be used to pro-
mote energy saving, demand management, and energy effi-
ciency. However, monitoring a households’ energy consump-
tion through SMs poses serious privacy threats, and have
thus become a major privacy issue. Fine-grained consump-
tion data could reveal what citizens do within their own
homes, how they spend their free time, whether they are
away on holiday or at work, when they watch TV or run a
washing machine, or even the use of some specific medical
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device. There is also a potential for extensive data mining
by combining fine-grained metering with data from other
sources. Notwithstanding, the benefits of smart metering
are so significant that it has given rise a significant amount
of research with the purpose of providing methods and mech-
anisms to reconcile smart metering technologies and privacy
requirements.
The two most important smart metering privacy require-
ments are: (i) fine-grained individual consumption data must
be accessible only to the corresponding individual; and (ii)
the consumption data of a customer for a billing period
(monthly or other) must be accessible to the contracted util-
ity supplier for billing purposes. hence, fine-grained data
metering, also called operational metering, should not be at-
tributable, whereas long-term consumption data, also called
accountable metering, should be attributable.
On the other hand, among the most important requirements
for smart metering privacy preserving systems are: (i) scal-
ability; (ii) fault tolerance; (iii) reduced computational and
storage capabilities in smart meters; (iv) low communication
overhead; and (v) rapid response. As we shall see, most cur-
rent privacy preserving proposals fall short in meeting one
of several of these requirements.
In the paper we show that Intel SGX technology can be
used to provide a simple and general solution for the smart
metering privacy problem detailed above.
2. INTEL SGX
Intel SGX can be described as a set of new instructions and
changes in memory access mechanisms added to the Intel
Architecture that allows an application to instantiate a pro-
tected area in the application’s address space, dubbed an
enclave [23]. An enclave is intended to ensure confidential-
ity and integrity of owned data even in the presence of priv-
ileged malware. Inside the enclave, code, data and stack
are protected by hardware enforced access control policies
which prevent attacks against the enclave’s content even
when these originate from privileged software such as vir-
tual machine monitors, BIOS, or operating systems.
Another critical feature of Intel SGX is a set of instructions
for remote attestation of a running enclave [2]. SGX pro-
vides means to generate a hardware based attestation that
an enclave has been successfully established on an SGX en-
abled platform and that a specific piece of software, and
nothing else, has been loaded within the enclave. Both fea-
tures, i.e., attestation and isolation, are essential to the so-
lution we propose in this paper.
Possible applications of Intel SGX have been discussed in
[18], where examples of applications that make use of the
capabilities of Intel SGX were presented, as well as an ap-
plication architecture including an application split between
components requiring security protection which should run
within enclaves, and components that do not require protec-
tion and can therefore be executed outside enclaves.
In [4] a set of tools is presented for specifying protocols that
extend the guarantees provided by isolated execution envi-
ronments, such as the Intel SGX, by means of its ability to
perform remote attestation. In this way, it becomes possible
to establish secure key exchange protocols between a remote
participant and an isolated execution environment. These
protocols are defined by the combination of a passively se-
cure key exchange protocol and an arbitrary attestation pro-
tocol.
3. PRIVACY-PRESERVING SOLUTIONS FOR
OPERATIONAL METERING
Basically, privacy preserving proposals for smart metering
have adopted one of the two following approaches: anonymiza-
tion and data aggregation. Next, we present each one of
them.
3.1 Anonymization approaches
Anonymization approaches have been based on trusted third
parties (TTP), zero knowledge proofs, and group keys/IDs.
Trusted third party solutions. TTP solutions include the
following proposals: (i) using a trusted neighborhood gate-
way to which SMs send their data at each time slot, and
which thereafter forwards to the utility supplier only the
metering data without the corresponding identity informa-
tion [24]; (ii) using a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for
the identification of smart meters to the TTP, in which a
SM may send to the TTP its private data encrypted with
both the public key of the supplier and a pseudonym private
key shared with the TTP, which may thus authenticate the
data but not read it before sending it to the utility supplier
encrypted with the latter’s public key, without any identifi-
cation details [22]; (iii) anonymization of operational meter-
ing data through pseudonymous certified by a TTP escrow
service [12]; and (iv) letting a trusted proxy, either the gate-
way or a TTP, play the role of an anonymizer hiding the
static IP address of SMs [17].
Apart from vulnerabilities such as timing attacks, the main
drawback of these anonymization approaches is related to
the trust model issues: in each case a TTP must be trusted.
We need solutions that minimize the required trusted base.
Zero Knowledge proofs. Instead of relying on TTPs, other
schemes have been proposed that are based on the SM send-
ing metering data in plaintext to authorized data recipients
using zero-knowledge methods to anonymously prove that it
is a legitimate SM, but without revealing any other informa-
tion, such as the identity of the SM [25, 19]. The main draw-
backs of these approaches are the high computational costs
and communication overheads induced by zero-knowledge
proof methods and the use of anonymous credentials.
Group keys and IDs. An anonymization approach was pro-
posed using a virtual ring architecture in which SMs are
organized, based on their location, into groups, each group
with a group ID and a pair of public/private ring keys used
by each SM to sign its operational metering data before
sending it to the utility supplier, which would thus be able
to verify the authenticity of the SM but not its ID [3]. A
limitation of this approach is lack of scalability, since the
message signature size increases linearly with the increasing
group size.
Another proposed scheme is based on group keys, HMAC
signatures, PKI, trusted substations, and the inclusion of
a trusted entity called control center (the power generator
system) [8]. The control center generates a system key and
distributes it to the SMs of a region and its corresponding
substation, which may then request more electricity by send-
ing to the control center a fresh pseudonym in the shape of a
random number concatenated with their real ID encrypted
with the control center’s public key. The main drawback
of this scheme is that the SMs protect their identities from
the substations, but not from the control center, and hence
from the utility itself. This was later improved in order to
guarantee that the real identities of the SMs remain hid-
den also to the control center, but in this case introducing
high a communication overhead [7], a drawback which was
eliminated later [9]. An improvement was also proposed by
replacing the blind signature with a ring signature [27], re-
ducing computational costs and communication overheads,
but at the price of enabling the control center to link elec-
tricity requests via a static pseudonym, and ultimately to a
real ID.
Another proposal [26] makes use of a non-trusted trans-
portation layer k-anonymity service (the Gateway Opera-
tor) using pseudonyms, each one used by at least k SMs for
sending encrypted metering data to the utility provider and
signed for the Gateway Operator, who verifies the signature,
removes it, and sends the encrypted message to the utility
provider. However, over a long period of time it has been
shown that long term aggregation of partial information can
break the anonymity of the users.
Finally, a proposal relying on a pseudonymous smart me-
tering protocol without a TTP was put forward in which
each SM generates its own blinded pseudonym, gets a sig-
nature of it from the service supplier, and thereafter un-
blinds the received signature [14]. In this way, a SM gets
a pseudonym that is signed by the utility supplier but that
the latter cannot associate with a specific SM. A drawback
here is that new SMs joining the system could have their
new pseudonyms easily linked to themselves.
Conclusions on anonymization approaches. As we may
see from the presented proposals, there is usually a trade-off
between the extent of the trusted base and the complexity
of the solution, either in terms of computation or communi-
cation overheads. Apart from the higher computational and
communication overheads associated with pseudomization
schemes, those schemes are vulnerable to de-anomization
attacks based on statistical analysis, correlation of account
and operational data, and side-channel attacks.
3.2 Data aggregation approaches
For operational purposes the value of the aggregate con-
sumption metering data of all the customers in a given re-
gion would be enough to guarantee the benefits of smart
metering. It is assumed that it would be difficult for the
utility supplier to decompose the individual users’ metering
data from the aggregated data, thus ensuring their privacy.
Three types of data aggregation approaches may be distin-
guished, based on (i) trusted third parties, (ii) data pertur-
bation, and (iii) cryptography.
Trusted third parties (TTPs). In these approaches, TTPs
may collect the raw metering data of all the users, aggregate
these data and deliver only the aggregated metering data to
the utility supplier or other authorized data recipients, en-
suring users’ privacy against the utility supplier, but not the
TTP, which receives all the metering data of the individual
users [5]. The use of pseudonyms known only to the supplier
has been suggested to prevent it, as shown in the previous
section. However, the use of pseudonyms leads to the draw-
backs of the anonymization approaches discussed above. An-
other scheme uses the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
for establishing a secret key shared between an SM and net-
work Gateways [15].
The obvious flaw in these types of schemes is that solutions
must rely on a TTP.
Data perturbation. The approach here is that each SM
adds random noise to its metering data so that the aggre-
gator is not be able to find out the original metering data
but may still calculate the aggregated value with a small or
negligible expected error [5]. Several types of random error
distributions have been proposed in the extensive literature
on the subject. The major drawback of these approaches is
the difference between the perturbed and real data and lack
of fault tolerance, since the failure of a single SM to deliver
its data may prevent obtaining a good estimation of the real
value.
Cryptography. The use of cryptographic primitives has been
proposed to overcome the drawbacks of the previous meth-
ods. Two approaches are common here, one based on secret
sharing schemes, and other on homomorphic encryption.
In the case of secret sharing schemes, measurements are com-
pletely hidden from the aggregator since it receives only en-
crypted measurements that it cannot decrypt and random
shares of the total consumption [16]. In this scheme, each
SM splits its measurements into k random shares, where k is
the number of SMs in a given set, including itself, keeps its
own share and sends to the aggregator the remaining shares
encrypted with the public keys of the corresponding SMs.
The aggregator will then add the shares encrypted with one
single key, using the homomorphic property of the encryp-
tion scheme, and sends the encrypted aggregated value to
the corresponding SM that may then decrypt it with its
secret key, add its own share, and send the result to the ag-
gregator, which upon receiving the sums from each SM may
obtain the total consumption value. The drawbacks with
this scheme are mainly that it is not scalable, since it relies
on secret sharing, and that the communication overhead is
significant.
Other approaches use masking in such a way that when the
masked inputs from all parties are summed, the masking val-
ues cancel each other out and the aggregator may thus ob-
tain the total consumption value, maybe using simple brute
force methods [21]. The communication and computation
overhead of this protocol is nevertheless significant. Other
approaches are based on computing the aggregated con-
sumption using a version of the Paillier cryptosystem [13].
This scheme requires SMs to be able to perform operations
such as Paillier encryption, hash functions, random number
generation, and to communicate with each other. Finally,
a solution relying on an additive homomorphic encryption
scheme that avoids the need for secret sharing or public
cryptosystems has also been presented [1]. Encryption here
is simple, consisting only of a modular addition operation.
The aggregator can be any SM, and the utility supplier can-
not observe the actual measurements because each one is
masked by a set of random numbers that cancel each other
out when they are added together. This scheme requires,
however, that each smart meter shares keys with the util-
ity supplier and exchange pseudo-random numbers among
themselves. Moreover, the aggregator must be trusted.
4. THE INTEL SGX SOLUTIONTOPRIVACY
PRESERVING SMART METERING
Models for privacy in smart metering typically include the
following components: (i) consumers, the end-users receiv-
ing the power supply, whose privacy must be protected;
(ii) the Aggregator, which receives the consumers’ metered
consumption from SMs, aggregates them and sends the re-
sulting aggregated values to the utility supplier; (iii) Smart
Metering Devices installed at the customer side of the net-
work that periodically sense the consumed energy and send
the measurements to the consumer and/or the aggregator;
(iv) the Utility Supplier, which is the company responsible
for electricity distribution and transportation infrastructure,
and whose operators may employ smart metering data in or-
der optimize the provision of electricity and load balancing;
and (v) the communication network enabling two-way com-
munication among the parties in a smart grid.
Borrowing from the notation introduced in Bohli et al. [5],
our model includes a set S = {SM1, ..., SMn} of smart me-
tering devices (SMs). We let ei,j denote the value of the
electricity consumption of the smart meter SMi in the pe-
riod j for j ∈ {1, ..., t}, where t denotes the total number of
time slots in one billing period. The metering values in a
smart metering period can thus be described by the matrix
(ei,j). The model assumes that each value ei,j is unknown to
the utility supplier, whereas the aggregated values
∑t
j=1 ei,j
for all j ∈ {1, ..., t} (the sum of electricity consumption val-
ues of an individual customer over a given time period) and∑|S|
i=1 ei,j for all i ∈ {1, ..., |S|} (the sum of the current elec-
tricity consumption of all customers) may be considered as
public and the only values that the utility supplier needs to
know.
In the trust model of our solution, the only trusted compo-
nent will be the SM devices. The aggregator will include an
SGX enclave component for performing aggregation which,
rather than trusted, is assumed to be secure.
The architecture of our solution is depicted in Figure 1. This
figure shows one round in the aggregation of metering values
for a given period of time j. Each smart meter SMi sends the
current metering value along a secure communication chan-
nel that has been previously established between the aggre-
gator and each smart meter. The aggregator collects these
values, aggregates them, and sends the aggregated value to
the utility provider. The aggregator will not reveal the indi-
vidual values because the aggregation happens in a protected
enclave that has been attested by each SM individually. The
verification of the attestation may happen with the aid of
a trusted component, the Attestation Service, which can be
the Intel Attestation Service1 or any other trusted agency.
The smart meters could also carry out this verification them-
selves. It is assumed that the SMs themselves are trusted
by the customers, and have been previously verified. At the
end of a billing period, the aggregator could also provide
the aggregated consumption value of each smart meter to
the utility provider. The code for this operation should also
be contained within the attested enclave.
Figure 1: Simplified scheme of the proposed SM ar-
chitecture
Details about the sequence of events in the main smart me-
tering are shown in Figure 2. In this scenario we include the
the actors appearing in Figure 1, but only a single smart me-
tering device (SM). It is assumed that the SM can identify
itself, maybe by means of a PKI key pair configured by the
Utility Provider (UP) at deployment time. The sequence
starts with the SM identifying itself to the Aggregator by
means of some predefined identification credentials. The
Aggregator sends the credentials to the UP for verification.
If the action succeeds, the Aggregator reports OK to the
SM, which will then proceed to attest the Aggregator to see
if it’s a legitimate Intel SGX platform and that it is run-
ning an enclave with the desired code. After the attestation
challenge has been sent, the Aggregator responds by send-
ing back a QUOTE structure signed with an Intel Enhanced
Privacy ID (EPID) key used to sign enclave attestations [6].
The QUOTE structure contains the information required for
1https://software.intel.com/en-us/blogs/2016/03/09/intel-
sgx-epid-provisioning-and-attestation-services
the attestation of an enclave. Several other communication
events may happen between the Aggregator and the SM
at this juncture, e.g., actions to exchange symmetric keys
in order to establish a secure channel between the SM and
the Aggregator, but for the sake of simplicity these are not
shown in the figure. If the verification of the attestation suc-
ceeds, the SM may report it to the Aggregator, upon which
it can start sending periodically the fine-grained values of
electric consumption along a secure channel which has been
established during the attestation process. The Aggregator
is supposed to collect the received metering values from each
SM in the system, and return the aggregated value to the
UP. At the end of a billing period it may also return the
aggregated consumption value of each SM, and start over
for a new period.
Figure 2: Sequence diagram of the main scenario
4.1 Evaluation of the proposed model
As we have seen in Section 3, most current solutions to the
smart metering privacy problem fall short in some of the
most important requirements for privacy and performance.
Our solution meets all those requirements in a simple way
and with a minimum trusted base. We consider these re-
quirements here one by one.
Scalability. The system is clearly scalable, since only sim-
ple communication operations on unencrypted values are
carried out by involved parties.
Fault tolerance. The Aggregator does not need to wait
for the consumption values of all smart meters. If one or
more of the SMs fails temporarily, the aggregation may be
performed with, for instance, some average value for the
latest received consumption values from the corresponding
SM. A threshold on the maximum fraction of failed instances
at any given time slot may be defined.
Limited computational and storage capabilities. Only
common cryptographic operations need to be carried out by
the smart metering devices, basically the ones required for
establishing secure channels.
Low communication overhead. Only some few simple pro-
cedures need be performed by the smart metering devices for
establishing attestation. Smart metering values are commu-
nicated at once, probably encrypted with the symmetric key
exchanged during the attestation process. The smart meters
do not need to know or communicate with each other, and
no further procedures are required.
Rapid response. No time consuming operations or proce-
dures are required. Aggregation is done on data in the clear
and only a simple summation operation is required.
For these reasons, we consider the presented solution as the
most appropriate one presented so far for preserving privacy
in smart metering systems. We assume only that Intel SGX
technology is secure. The attacks that can be carried out
against the proposed protocol are basically those that can be
directed against Intel SGX (for a detailed account of possible
threats and vulnerabilities in Intel SGX, see [10]).
Being a novel technology, the security of Intel SGX itself is
still an open issue.
5. PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
For assessing the performance of the proposed architecture,
two different implementations were made in C++, the first
one a simple non-secure implementation without any privacy
guarantees or other overhead, and the second one an imple-
mentation of the privacy preserving Intel SGX based archi-
tecture presented above. For comparison purposes, in both
implementations the same test case was used, i.e. household
energy consumption aggregated by region.
In the first implementation, all the measured data is sent
by the corresponding smart meters in plain text to the ag-
gregator, which thereafter aggregates all measurements and
sends it to the utility supplier. In the second one, based on
the Intel SGX technology, each smart meter, before sending
its consumption measurement data, will first identify itself
and thereafter attest remotely the aggregator.
For communication between smart meters and aggregators,
a bus service solution provided by Apache Kafka2 was used,
which ensures scalability, fault tolerance, and performance.
In order to allow communication between the C++ appli-
cations and Apache Kafka, the library librdkafka3 was used.
Additionally, the remote attestation process is carried out
by means of a sequence of RESTful calls using the Restbed
2http://kafka.apache.org
3https://github.com/edenhill/librdkafka
framework4. Every attestation message is represented by a
JSON5, a data-interchange format.
The tests were conducted in a private cloud using OpenStack
for the orchestration of the cloud application with Docker
containers (using the OpenStack driver nova-docker). The
containers executed Ubuntu Linux 14.04 and the Intel SGX
drivers6. These containers were run on computers with one
Intel i7-6700 SGX capable processor and 8 GB of RAM.
5.1 The Experiments
The experiments consisted of two parts. The first part aimed
to compare the execution time for the aggregation of daily
consumption data for regions with 50, 100, 200, 300, 400 and
500, 600, 700 and 750 households, sending measurements ev-
ery 60 seconds. For every group size, 10 runs were executed.
Also, Figure 3 shows the run times with a 95% confidence
interval. This experiment is important in order to find out
the overhead caused by security measures.
Figure 3: Comparison between aggregating within
SGX enclave and within regular code
The second part had the objective of showing the relation
between the memory access cost and the amount of memory
allocated to an SGX enclave. The results can be seen in
Figure 4 and show a considerable increase in access cost
when the memory exceeds the size of the enclave page cache.
This effect is a consequence of cache lines being paged out
to main memory, requiring (hardware-based) encryption as
data leaves the processor.
5.2 Discussion
As can be seen in Figure 3, the overhead of SGX is in the or-
der of 40 to 60 times. Despite the increased execution time,
the benefits are significant because the privacy of the house-
holds are protected by the fact that the electricity consump-
tion values are passed to the enclave within the aggregator
along a secure channel established during the attestation
process, and only the aggregated values will ever leave the
enclave (as the code can be verified with the attestation).
On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that the
4https://github.com/Corvusoft/restbed
5http://www.json.org/
6https://01.org/intel-softwareguard-eXtensions (since June
24, 2016).
Figure 4: Comparison between reading from SGX
enclave and from unencrypted memory
memory space that can be allocated to an enclave is cur-
rently limited to 128 MB for all the enclaves within an Intel
SGX platform, and, access times can increase significantly
when this limit is reached, causing a different kind of pagina-
tion, where memory will be allocated outside the enclave in
an encrypted way. This kind of pagination, as of September
2016, only works on Linux platforms.
Nevertheless, for applications that require a small memory
footprint as is our case, approximately 256 bytes are needed
to store accumulated data and cryptographic keys. There-
fore, one single enclave can be used to aggregate data from
up to 500,000 smart meters without exceeding the enclave
memory. Additional load distribution is also possible by
balancing the SMs accross multiple SGX-capable machines.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown how Intel SGX technology can
be used to provide a simple and general solution for the
smart metering privacy problem. We provided a short in-
troduction to a variety of previous solutions, as well as an
account of the proposed Intel SGX based architecture pro-
viding a general and efficient solution to the problem. Fi-
nally, we presented also a set of experiments for assessing
the performance of the proposed solution.
As future work we aim to assess other strategies for aggrega-
tion such as garbled circuits [20] and multi-party secure com-
puting [11]. Moreover, with regard to Intel SGX we intend
to integrate our implementation into cloud environments by,
e.g., introducing mechanisms such as smooth remote attes-
tation [4]. We also want to test how our architecture will
perform using other secure hardware processing strategies,
such as AMD Secure Memory Encryption (SME) and Secure
Encrypted Virtualization (SEV).
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